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THOMAS I. EMERSONt
T E Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr 1 promises to be one of the
most important of the century. Like the segregation decisions, 2 it brings con-
stitutional principles and judicial institutions to the solution of one of the fun-
damental problems of American society. Unlike the decisions in the Smith
and McCarran Act cases,3 which have no future in the democratic process, it
moves broadly in the direction of developing and supporting procedures neces-
sary for the effective operation of a modern democratic system. The decision
is of interest and significance on various levels. The major ones are (1) its
importance in terms of legal doctrine; (2) its bearing on the actual solution of
the malapportionment problem; and (3) its broader implications concerning
the role of law and legal institutions in the democratic process.
I. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DOCTRINE
The failure of five Justices to agree upon an opinion necessarily limits the
significance of Baker v. Carr in doctrinal terms. Moreover, the strong dissent
of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, and the grudging acquiescence of Justices
Clark and Stewart, confirmed the close division of the Court over issues of the
sort presented. The retirement of Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter, and
their replacement by Justices White and Goldberg, whose constitutional views
have not yet become apparent, makes speculation on the Court's future direc-
tion additionally hazardous. Nevertheless, the decision in Baker 'v. Carr does
throw some light upon possible developments in the three main legal doctrines
raised in the case: equal protection, justiciability, and the guaranty clause.
In applying the broad constitutional requirement of equal protection of the
laws, the Supreme Court has, with a few sharp exceptions, moved with the
utmost caution. The chief exception is, of course, in the area of racial discrim-
ination. Here the Court, at least since Brown v. Board of Education, has
enforced the provision vigorously, even when necessary to extend the doctrine
of "state action" to unprecedented and still unforeseen lengths.4 It has also in-
voked the principle in the field of criminal procedure, as evidenced by its line
of decisions requiring the states to afford equal opportunity for indigent de-
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1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also, Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S.
1 (1961).
4. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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fendants to invoke facilities for appeal.6 Beyond these limited sectors, however,
the Court has traditionally been extremely reluctant to set foot in what has
seemed to it the bottomless quagmire of equal protection." All government
action involves discrimination between persons affected and those not affected,
or between those affected in certain ways and those affected in others. To
separate the appropriate from the inappropriate differences in treatment has
undoubtedly appeared a dubious exercise in judicial supervision from which
the Court has naturally shrunk. Yet the requirement of equal protection of the
laws constitutes a fundamental principle of a democratic society, and one more
subject to disregard or violation as government controls over society expand.
It remains one of the few areas where the courts can legitimately exercise some
degree of control over the substantive results of the working of the democratic
process. Narrower than substantive due process, which the courts have, quite
properly, largely abandoned, an increased supervision over equality of treat-
ment by the state in exercising its manifold powers could become a vital func-
tion of our judicial system.
In Baker v. Carr a majority of the Court did not, of course, officially reach
the merits and hence did not treat the application of the equal protection clause
to apportionment cases. But it held that the clause was applicable, in that a
"substantial question" was raised under it.7 And the plain implication of the
decision was that an apportionment as seriously distorted as that of Tennessee
was most likely a violation of equal protection. Despite the enormously difficult
problem of working out standards for utilizing the equal protection provision
in apportionment cases-a difficulty the dissenters played to the hilt-the
majority felt impelled to enter the field. And, just as in the race discrimination
cases the Court found it necessary to give a wholly new meaning to "state
action," so here it was not deterred by the novel and dangerous problem of
fashioning adequate relief. The fact that the Court was dealing with the right
to vote, a fundamental and special area, indicates that one should perhaps not
make too much of this new use of the equal protection clause. Yet the decision
does suggest that the concept of equal protection may well in the future receive
increased attention in its application to other aspects of our national life.
With respect to the justiciability doctrine, the fact that the Court agreed to
decide the apportionment issue is in itself momentous. For it did so in the face
of the violently partisan nature of the problem, the elusiveness of standards, the
possible repudiation of judicial efforts to frame a remedy, the long line of con-
trary decisions behind which it could have hidden 8 and much scholarly advice
5. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 703
(1961) ; Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) ; Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms
& Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
6. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346
U.S. 545 (1954) ; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) ; Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). But cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
7. 369 U.S. at 198-204.
8. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and following cases, discussed 369 U.S.
at 234-37.
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to stick to the "passive virtues." Plainly, the realm of non-justiciability has
been narrowed. It will not be quite the same again.
More specifically, the Court's treatment of the "political question" is likely
to result in some crystalization and confining of that amorphous concept. Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion first eliminates from coverage of the doctrine all
matters concerning "the federal judiciary's relationship to the States," limit-
ing it to "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government. . . ."10 It then rejects blanket application of the
doctrine to any broad areas of categories of cases, such as "[f] oreign relations,"
"[d]ates of duration of hostilities," validity of procedures in enacting consti-
tutional amendments or statutes, and "[t] he status of Indian tribes.""1 To the
contrary, it stresses "the need for case-by-case inquiry," "the necessity for dis-
criminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case,
and the impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing. ' " Further, the
opinion goes on to enumerate the specific elements which make an issue into
a "political question."'1 3 There is a strong implication that the list given is ex-
clusive. But even if not, the listing compresses the doctrine into a far more
rigid form. Hereafter litigants will not be faced with a completely open-ended
concept, but will have the opportunity to argue their way out of each individual
element. It is to be noted that Justices Clark and Stewart did not question
these features of the Brennan opinion, and that Mr. Justice Douglas went
beyond.
The Court's handling of the "political question" issue thus has significant
implications in other areas. For example, it may well prove important in such
matters as the Court's function in dealing with state attempts to invoke martial
law, provided no head-on clash between the Court and Congress or the Presi-
dent is involved. Similarly, it may even open up such questions as federal
court enforcement of section 2 of the fourteenth amendment, providing for
reduction in the congressional representation of states which deny their citizens
the right to vote.14
Less surely, but potentially of more importance, the decision in Baker v.
Carr may have significance in the Court's future treatment of the guaranty
clause. The provision in article IV, section 4, guaranteeing each state a repub-
lican form of government, was originally designed as a basic feature of our
constitutional structure. It was intended to mean more than that the federal
government had the power and duty to protect the states against insurrection
or invasion, for these protections were included in the same section as separate
9. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Tern--Foreword: The Passive Vrues, 75
HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961).
10. 369 U.S. at 210.
11. 369 U.S. at 211-17.
12. 369 U.S. at 210-11, 217.
13. Summarized in 369 U.S. at 217.
14. See Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amiendment, 46 CORNxLL L.Q. 108 (1960).
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guaranties. At the time of Dorr's Rebellion in 1841-42 the guaranty clause was
invoked as the basis for a claim which would have required the Supreme Court
to decide which one of two competing Rhode Island governments was the
legitimate one. In Luther v. Borden,'5 however, the Court held, in a sweeping
opinion, that this issue was non-justiciable. The guaranty clause %as utilized
after the Civil War as the major constitutional basis for the program of Re-
construction enacted by Congress. But in the following decades the guaranty
clause became in practice largely superseded by the fourteenth amendment. In
1912, in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,'0 the guaranty clause was
relied upon as a ground for arguing that the Oregon initiative and referendum
law was invalid as inconsistent with a republican form of government. The
Court, again in a broad opinion, held this issue non-justiciable. Since then the
traditional rule has been that all claims presented to the Court under the guar-
anty clause are non-justiciableYt
Mr. Justice Brennan purported to leave guaranty clause doctrine unchanged.
But his treatment of the issue may in fact have reopened the question. The
Brennan opinion does not take the position that the guaranty clause is to be
interpreted as vesting enforcement only in Congress or the Executive. On the
contrary, it expressly states that the sole reason the guaranty clause is not
enforceable by the courts is that the issues raised under it are "political ques-
tions."1 8 Mir. justice Frankfurter agreed. 19 But since Mir. Justice Brennan
repudiates the notion that "political questions" are to be determined by blanket
categories and makes clear that each case must be determined on its own facts,
it would seem that the issue of justiciability under the guaranty clause would
likewise turn on whether the essential elements of a "political question" are
present in any particular case. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan concedes
that a question of republican form of government does not always become a
political one by reason of "the lack of criteria" for judgnment.- Once these two
objections are eliminated, it is hard to see why the Court should not treat
questions under the guaranty clause the same as other alleged "political ques-
15. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
16. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
17. The rule presumably does not mean that action taken by Congress or the President
upon the basis of the guaranty clause is not subject to any review whatever by the courts;
this would allow the legislative and executive branches, through the mere formality of in-
voking the clause, to evade judicial review and, in fact, would come close to destroying the
whole institution of judicial review. Indeed, in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an attempt by Congress, relying on the guaranty
clause, to specify the location of Oklahoma's capital as a condition of admission to the
Union. See also 369 U.S. at 226 n.53. But the extent of review by the Supreme Court over
the exercise of power by the other branches in reliance on the guaranty clause has never
been clarified.
For an historical account of the guaranty clause, see Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause
of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MiNN. L. R-v. 513
(1962).
18. 369 U.S. at 218, 228-29.
19. 369 U.S. at 297.
20. 369 U.S. at 222-23 n.48.
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tions." On this view, the Court would hold guaranty clause cases non-justiciable
only where a decision would involve a direct clash with Congress or the Presi-
dent, or involve one of the other elements of a "political question" listed by
Mr. Justice Brennan. Clearly Mr. Justice Brennan did not draw this conclu-
sion. But it seems implicit in his analysis. The other Justices forming the
majority did not challenge this approach. And Mr. Justice Douglas was ob-
viously thinking in these terms.21
For these reasons it appears possible that the Court might in the future con-
sider apportionment issues under the guaranty clause. As we argue later, there
would be many advantages in doing so. Beyond this, were the Court to enter-
tain claims under the guaranty clause, in cases where none of the Brennan
elements of a "political question" were present, it would open up an important
new line of constitutional growth. While the original purpose of the guaranty
clause was primarily to assure that the states did not take on an aristocratic,
monarchistic, or despotic form of government, the interpretation of republican
form of government in the light of modern developments would extend the
application of the provision to numerous significant areas. Thus, issues such
as the closing of public schools might be dealt with in terms of maintaining a
republican form of government. Such a development of constitutional doctrine
would be entirely consistent with the Court's current role as an institution for
supporting and vitalizing the mechanisms of the democratic process without
undertaking to supervise the results reached by that process.
2 2
II. EXTENT OF SOLUTION OF THE APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM
What does Baker v. Carr portend as to the Supreme Court's handling of
the apportionment problem when it reaches the merits? Will the Court con-
fine itself to certain kinds of cases? What standards will it apply in determin-
ing the validity of an apportionment system? What will be the nature of the
remedy decreed? And to what extent is judicial action likely to solve or alleviate
the basic problem?
It would be foolhardy to attempt detailed answers to these questions. No
one is now in possession of all the facts. The issues are varied and complex;
many cannot now be clearly defined or anticipated. The degree to which state
political machinery is capable of reforming itself cannot be known. Public
response, and hence the effective power of the Supreme Court, is not fully
foreseeable. The ultimate solution, if one is ever completely achieved, must be
hammered out by a long process of discussion and compromise in accordance
with the democratic tradition. At most, therefore, it is possible to note some
of the major issues, consider some tentative solutions, and perhaps indicate
the general direction of events.
21. 369 U.S. at 242-43 n.2. For an elaboration of this argument, see Bonfield, Baker
v. Carr: New Light on the Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CAMP. L. REv. 245,
246-52 (1962).
22. On the current potential of the guaranty clause, see Bonfield, supra note 17, at
560-69.
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A. Types of Situations Open to Judicial Considcration
Baker v. Carr involved (1) state legislative districts; (2) state constitutional
provisions basing apportionment in both houses roughly on equal population,
the apportionment to be made by the legislature on a decennial basis; (3) fail-
ure by the legislature to reapportion over a long period of years; and (4) no
available method, other than action by the legislature, by which the constitu-
tional mandate could be carried out. There is nothing in the decision to in-
dicate, however, that a justiciable constitutional cause of action will be found
only where all these elements are present.
The two other situations in which a claimed malapportionment of state
legislative districts might occur would clearly seem to fall within the principles
enunciated by the decision. Where the asserted inequality arises from affirma-
tive action of the legislature, rather than failure to act, the case for judicial
review would appear even more plain. Indeed, here the problem of devising a
remedy may be less difficult. Where the state constitution itself creates the
alleged malapportionment-the so-called de jure case-no additional theoretical
problems are presented. It is immaterial whether state action denying equal
protection derives from statutory or constitutional sources. And, while the
framing of a remedy might be more troublesome, it is unlikely that such diffi-
culties would be sufficiently greater to alter the Court's position. The remand
of the Michigan and New York cases indicates that the de jure situation will
also reach decision on the merits.23
With regard to inequality in congressional districts, there is language in the
Brennan opinion which might suggest that Baker v. Carr is not decisive on the
issue of justiciability. As already mentioned, the opinion takes pains to point
out that the doctrine of "political questions" does not apply to relations of the
federal courts to the states, but rather is a matter of the relationships between
the coordinate branches of the federal government.2 And in the case of con-
gressional districts, Congress enters the picture under its power to determine
the qualifications and supervise the election of its own members. Yet it seems
most unlikely that the Supreme Court will refuse to entertain cases of this
nature. The possibility of open conflict with Congress is remote. Practical
remedies, as will be seen shortly, are more readily available. Colegrove v.
Green,25 the main obstacle to the Court's new position, was not distinguished
on this ground. Moreover, the momentum engendered by Baker v. Carr would
seem to assure that the Court will not go out of its way to create distinctions
that would in practice appear entirely artificial, imposing greater restrictions
on districting state legislative seats than congressional seats. Finally, Mr.
Justice Brennan expressly declared, speaking for three members of the Court,
that prior cases "settled the issue in favor of justiciability of questions of con-
gressional redistricting."
26
23. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
24. See text at note 10 supra.
- 25. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
26. 369 U.S. at 232. But cf. Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962)
(dismissing a congressional district case).
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Nor does there seem to be any doubt that the principles of Baker v. Carr
are applicable to primary elections. Under the Classic case and the white
primary cases primaries are treated as integral parts of the election process and
equally subject to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.21
There remain for consideration those situations in which a remedy other
than through action of the state legislature itself might be available. In the
few states where statutes provide for apportionment by administrative com-
mission or similar device, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly insist upon
exhaustion of state administrative remedies before federal relief can be sought.
And in certain cases where doubtful questions of interpretation of state con-
stitutional provisions are involved, the Court might require state judicial rem-
edies to be pursued. Otherwise, there would appear to be little justification for
the Court to refuse consideration of the merits on the ground that other reme-
dies are available. Individual rights accruing under the equal protection clause
are not normally dependent upon exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Relief
by way of initiative and referendum laws, available in some states, is too
cumbersome and uncertain to serve as the basis of any doctrine of exhaustion.
The difficulty under such procedures of framing a detailed constitutional
amendment or statute acceptable to a majority of voters, the lack of oppor-
tunity for amending or compromising the initial proposal, the effort and ex-
pense of collecting a large number of valid signatures, and similar inflexibilities
and technicalities render such devices of dubious practicality.2 Similar con-
siderations apply to state constitutional provisions for popular initiative in call-
ing a constitutional convention. It is to be noted that only Mr. Justice Clark
put any stress on the absence of other forms of relief. At most the existence
of such devices might be one factor to be considered in determining whether to
afford discretionary equitable relief; it should scarcely be decisive of the issue.
In sum, it would seem that Baker v. Carr has opened to judicial considera-
tion all aspects of the malapportionment problem, regardless of the source of
the claimed inequality.
B. Standards
The formulation of "judicially manageable" standards for decision of future
cases on the merits poses a difficult and intriguing problem. The majority in
Baker v. Carr did not undertake to solve it, and those Justices who discussed
the question were in agreement only on the proposition that the equal protec-
tion clause prohibits "invidious discrimination." Efforts by lower courts and
commentators to work out an acceptable formula have not progressed very far.
The issue will yield to solution only on a case-by-case basis.
27. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S, 461
(1953).
28. See, for example, the problems of securing relief through the initiative in Okla-
homa, recited in the amicus brief filed by the Governor of Oklahoma in Baker v. Carr, at
pp. 14-17.
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Certain aspects of the problem, however, would not appear too difficult. In
a case, such as Baker v. Carr itself, where the state constitution provides for
legislative districts of roughly equal population, either in both houses or only
one, the failure by the legislature to maintain such districts would constitute
a classic form of denial of equal protection. The case would be no different
from any other in which state officials administered state law on a discrimina-
tory basis.2 9 The standard for complying with the equal protection clause would
therefore be the creation of legislative districts consisting of substantially equal
number of voters. Variations by reason of observing county lines, handling
fractions, and the like would exist, but only to the extent necessary to meet
practical problems. According to expert estimates such variations should not
exceed ten to fifteen per cent. In a case of this nature, in short, there is no
reason why the Supreme Court should not require the state to adhere to the
basic requirements of the state constitution. 0
The standard applicable to congressional districting would likewise not appear
to involve any great difficulty. The federal constitution, particularly in provid-
ing that members of the House of Representatives are to be elected by "the
People of the several States," would not seem to contemplate that in choosing
such representatives the vote of one qualified citizen should carry substantially
less weight than that of another.3 ' Certainly it is the general expectation that
congressional districts be formed of roughly equal population. The Supreme
Court may therefore properly hold that the creation of congressional districts
of unequal voting strength constitutes a denial of equal protection. And the
standard for measuring adherence to this constitutional requirement is simply
that the districts be, within practical limits, equal in population.
Once the Court gets involved beyond this point, however, the difficulties in-
crease. When the state constitution, or the state legislature acting within the
state constitution, takes into account factors other than population, the problem
of deciding when the inequality in terms of numbers becomes so egregious as
to outweigh the value of the other factors, thereby becoming "invidious dis-
crimination," is not easily answered.
At the outset, one must ask the question whether this problem is not better
conceived as an issue of republican form of government than of equal protec-
tion. There is much force in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument that equal
protection implies some basic standard from which to measure deviation, and
that the determination of this standard is essentially a question of republican
29. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
30. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued in Baker v. Carr that the fact that tie
Tennessee apportionment was in violation of the Tennessee Constitution did not in itself
constitute a violation of the equal protection, clause. 369 U.S. at 325-27, 332. It is difficult
to follow this reasoning. It is true that a state constitutional provision creating unequal
districts might violate equal protection, just as a statute would, and in this sense the dis-
tinction between constitution and statute is immaterial. But it does not follow that a statute
denying rights established by the state constitution might not constitute a separate and
different violation, of the equal protection clause.
31. Art. I, § 2.
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form of government. 32 In any event there can be little doubt that the Court, in
seeking a solution of the apportionment, problem, will actually be thinking in
terms of republican form of government. That concept is indeed well designed
for coping with the question. Historically the idea of a republican form of
government was closely tied in with the system of legislative representation;
it has become even more so today as the right to the franchise has widened.
On the other hand, the equal protection requirement is limited by the doctrine
that the state is entitled to make a "reasonable classification." But, as Mr.
Justice Harlan comes close to showing, the application of "reasonable classi-
fication" is hardly adequate to solve the apportionment problem and, in this
area, will have to be badly strained or abandoned. Thus the republican form
of government concept is both more relevant and more precise. It would cer-
tainly serve as a better vehicle through which the Court could articulate and
justify its conclusions.
83
The Court may well, however, hesitate to add to its burdens by making such
a seemingly radical departure as to revive the guaranty clause. And it must be
admitted that all that it needs, or possibly wants, to do can be crammed with-
in the formula of "invidious discrimination." We must therefore examine the
problem on the assumption that the Court adheres to the equal protection
formulation.
It has been urged that the Court, in applying the equal protection clause,
should rule out all factors which have the effect of creating any substantial
deviation from a system of legislative districts consisting of equal population.
This position has been taken by the American Civil Liberties Union.8 4 There
is much to be said in its favor. When one comes to examine the factors other
than population-and there are actually far fewer than the "host" of which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaks-the argument for giving them weight in a
modem system of state apportionment is far from persuasive. The major ones
are recognition of political subdivisions, weight according to density of popula-
tion, representation of various communities of interest, and historical factors.
Others, such as stability of the apportionment system, retaining honored in-
cumbents, and the like are purely secondary. It is not possible here to analyze
these various factors in detail but serious questions can be raised as to their
value in outweighing the right of each citizen to an equal vote in electing his
state legislature.
Thus, recognition of political subdivisions is not a matter of first importance
today in the internal affairs of a state. There is no real analogy here to the
position of the states at the time of framing the federal constitution, when
claims of sovereignty forced acceptance of a system of two Senators from each
state. Moreover, subdivisional lines can be respected without unduly distorting
the voting population of the districts, provided there is no requirement that
32. 369 U.S. at 299-301.
33. For further elaboration of the argument, see the two Bonfield articles, supra notes
17 and 21.
34. American Civil Liberties Union Weekly Bulletin, Mar. 20, 1961, pp. 1-2.
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each subdivision have a- whole vote. The argument for giving greater weight
to areas of thin population is -that density of population gives an advantage in
political organization. But the revolution in transportation and communication,
and the phenomenal growth of organization generally, have radically altered
this situation. Indeed, it can be argued that social pressures leading to political
cohesion are. more likely to be found in rural than urban areas, and that legis-
lators representing the steady clientele of rural areas have advantages over
their colleagues representing more volatile urban constituencies. The theory
that any particular "community of interest" should be given greater represen-
tation in the state legislature than its numbers entitle it to is essentially incon-
sistent with our notions of democratic process. The theory is little more than
a throwback to the days of property-holding qualifications on the right to vote.
The advantages of veto power potential and protection of minority rights are
afforded through other features of our political system. The historical argu-
ment, developed at great length by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is at first sight
impressive. But actually it proves too much, for it assumes the validity of
political ideas and practices long since repudiated. The historical trend has
-been entirely in favor of equality of the franchise.
It will be urged that considerations of this nature are matters of policy for
legislatures and the framers of constitutional amendments, not for courts. This
is in part true. And it is perhaps doubtful that such arguments, even if fully
supported by empirical evidence, will persuade the Supreme Court in the near
future to establish a standard of equal protection based upon voting population
alone. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the Court's function that the argument for
representation founded upon such other factors is a dubious one. For, as we
point out later, unless the Court adopts some mechanical formula of allowable
deviation in apportionment cases, it will be forced into some consideration of
the validity and weight of the reasons offered for qualifying the underlying
right to equality in voting. If the -propositions here advanced are sound, the
Court should at least scrutinize non-population factors with care and require
proponents of such a system to establish their case with precision. To this
extent the doctrine that the burden of establishing unconstitutionality rests
upon those challenging the legislative classification should be modified.
If we turn to less speculative matters, the problem still remains of giving
some content to the test of "invidious discrimination." It seems clear that the
Court will not adopt Mr. Justice Harlan's rule of a scintilla of rationality. 5 As
Mr. Justice Harlan himself demonstrates, such a doctrine would never, or
hardly ever, result in a decision that the equal protection clause had been
violated. It is likewise very doubtful that a majority of the Court will accept
Mr. Justice Clark's "crazy qult"' 30 principle, or even the "without-any-possible-
justification-ir--rationality" formula 37 of Mr. Justice Stewart. Such approaches
do not go very far toward solving the problem, and the Court seems committed
35. 369 U.S. at 336-37, 345-49.
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 265.
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at least to making a serious attempt. Rather, it is more likely that the Court
will look at the situation in terms of whether or not factors other than popu-
lation operate so as unduly to subordinate the basic right to equality in exercis-
ing the franchise.
What, in practice, would the adoption of some such intermediate formula
mean? In the first place, the Court should refuse to legitimize all factors that
are non-democratic in character. Thus an apportionment system based on
racial factors would clearly constitute a denial of equal protection. On the same
theory the New Hampshire system, under which senatorial districts are formed
in accordance with the proportion of direct taxes paid, i.e., on the basis of
wealth, would appear vulnerable.38 Very likely an attempted justification for
giving special weight to particular economic or other interests would fall with-
in the same ban.
Secondly, the Court might accept the proposition that at least one house of
the legislature must be apportioned on an equal population basis. This is the
federal system. All but eleven states, at least in theory, now substantially meet
this requirement. 9 And the average citizen would certainly feel that a system
in which neither house was elected on a one-man, one-vote basis could not be
reconciled with equal protection of the laws.
Yet, if the Court stopped here, the apportionment problem would still be far
from settled. It would give a majority of voters a veto power, but it would not
assure them legislative strength to take affirmative action. The crucial issue,
therefore, becomes how far would deviations from a population basis be al-
lowed in the second house. There is probably substantial agreement on the
chief elements to be considered in measuring the extent of deviation. They are
(1) the proportion of the total voters who are able to elect a majority of the
representatives to that house; and (2) the relative value of a vote in the larger
districts as compared with the smaller ones, measured either by direct com-
parison or by comparison with an average. But there is no agreement on the
formula for determining at what point these discrepancies are sufficiently great
to violate the equal protection clause.
Various standards have been proposed. In the Georgia county unit case the
three-judge court formulated the rule that the discrepancy existing with respect
to any county would be valid if no greater than "the disparity that exists
against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation, or tinder the
equal proportions formula for representation of the several states in the Con-
gress... . ."40 This formula would apparently make the Georgia county unit
system untenable.41 Mr. Bonfield has suggested that deviation in the first
element mentioned above should not exceed that existing at the time of entry
of the state into the Union, or that suffered by any state through its repre-
38. N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 26.
39. See BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT 5-8, 63-70 (1960).
40. Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
41. NY, Ti!mes, june 19, 1962, p. 1, col. 2,
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sentation in the United States Senate, whichever standard is higher.4 2 The
test of Senate representation would invalidate all state systems in which less
than 16.5 per cent of the voters elected a majority of representatives; the his-
torical test would vary with each state but generally would call for more equality
than presently exists. A further possibility is that the Court simply accept some
fixed percentage of deviation as permissible or impermissible.4 3
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court will accept rigid standards of this
nature. If it does not, then it must undertake a more thorough exploration of
the merits of each case. It would have to take into account all relevant factors,
including the claimed justification for deviations from equal population, and
render a general verdict as to whether the system does or does not unduly
subordinate equality of voting power. Eventually such a method may come to
form a pattern which can be generalized into a more specific standard. Under
such an approach, much will depend upon the extent to which the Court is
willing to scrutinize the justifications advanced in support of deviations. If the
conclusion stated above is correct, that such justifications are not persuasive,
the trend of decision would be strongly in the direction of an equal population
standard.& "
It should be noted that the Court's difficulties in devising a standard could
be lightened by congressional assistance. The power of Congress to provide
specific standards for the creation of congressional districts would not seem
open to question. And under the guaranty clause,45 Congress could also frame
standards for state legislative districting. There would be some advantages in
action by Congress to this end, for it would permit fuller consideration of policy
issues in devising standards and place the prestige of the federal legislature be-
hind the Court's effort to solve the apportionment problem. Yet the difficulties
of formulating adequate standards to cover the varied systems of state legis-
lative apportionment would still remain. And divergence between congressional
and judicial views would give rise to still further problems.
C. Remedies
The greatest danger facing the courts in dealing with the question of reme-
dies has been that legislative or executive officials would refuse to comply with
42. Bonfield, .spra note 21, at 257-62.
43. See, e.g., Scholle v. Hare on remand, in which two of the four majority justices
said: "When a legislative apportionment provides districts having more thanr double the
population of others, the constitutional range of discretion is violated." 367 Mich. 176, -,
116 N.W2d 350, 355 (1962).
44. We do not here undertake to consider the standard that would be applicable in
cases where the populations of voting districts are roughly equal but with district lines
gerrymandered to the advantage of one political party. The problems overlap because the
professed desire to achieve equal population could be used as a device to achieve an in-
vidious gerrymander. The factors to be taken into account in formulating a standard for
dealing with this type of manipulation, however, are somewhat different from those relevant
to the equal population issue.
45. U.S, CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
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remedial decrees. The spectre of open conflict between the courts, "possessed
neither of the purse nor the sword," and officials of other branches, fired with
partisan zeal and threatened in their very political existence, has continually
haunted the judiciary. Actually, these fears have proved groundless. Such con-
flict did not occur in situations where state courts, before Baker v. Carr, under-
took to formulate a remedy.46 And there has been no sign of this sort of opposi-
tion in the many cases that have already followed Baker v. Carr.47 In contrast
to the hostile response which greeted the segregation decisions in the South,
the apportionment decision has met with general support throughout the coun-
try and, indeed, has proved to be a highly popular one. The pattern of accept-
ance thus far demonstrated is likely to become more deeply rooted as time
passes and the role of the courts becomes more permanently fixed. In this
context the problem of remedies, if not simple, by no means appears insoluble.
Mr. Justice Clark, in his opinion in Baker v. Carr, objected to federal courts'
assuming jurisdiction of reapportionment cases "in the hope that such a declara-
tion, as is made today, [would] have the direct effect of bringing on legislative
action and relieving the courts of the problem of fashioning relief"; in his view
"this would be nothing less than blackjacking the Assembly into reapportion-
ing the State."' 48 Yet something of this sort must necessarily be a court's initial
step. A declaratory judgment or an opinion holding the existing system in-
valid, with postponement of further decree until the legislature can act, would
normally be the court's opening move. Such a procedure has the advantage of
placing the burden of affirmative action where it belongs, on the legislative or
constitutional amending process, and reserving to the court the veto, modifying
and approving function. The possibility of delay is not the all-important factor
here that it may be in other types of litigation. And the court, by retaining
jurisdiction, can act quickly to render a decision on the validity of the modified
system. Many of the district courts confronted with the problem of remedies
in the flood of litigation after Baker v. Carr have adopted this approach, in-
cluding those in Florida, Colorado, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and in the Tennes-
see case itself on remand.
49
In this connection, an important issue may be whether modification of a sys-
tem based on the state constitution can be undertaken by the legislature. The
46. See, e.g., Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAlty. L.
REv. 1057, 1066-70, 1087-90 (1958); 369 U.S. at 250 n,.5.
47. For discussion of the cases up to the first week of September, see Goldberg, The
Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90 (1962). The best source of information
concerning current cases is the National Municipal League, 47 East 68 St., New York 21,
N.Y.
48. 369 U.S. at 260.
49. Sobel v. Adams, Civ. No. 182-62-M, S.D. Fla., decided July 23, 1962; Stein v.
General Assembly of Colorado, No. 20240, Sup. Ct. of Colo., decided July 9, 1962; Toombs
v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Butcher v. Trimarchi, No. 2431, Equity,
No. 151, Commonwealth Docket, Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, Pa,, decided
June 13, 1962; Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). For more details on
these cases see Goldberg, supra note 47.
[Vol. 72: 64
1962] MALAPPORTIONMENT AND JUDICIAL POWER 77
amending process is, in some states, an elaborate one which may take several
years to complete. In such circumstances, however, there would seem to be no
constitutional reason why the legislature could not, at least temporarily, change
the system to meet federal constitutional requirements, pending action by the
more time-consuming procedures of amendment.
In order for the initial judicial step to be successful, forcing the job of fram-
ing a valid system on the legislature, it is necessary that the court have in
reserve some positive form of action which renders its "threat" plausible and
exerts the requisite pressure on the legislature to act. Perhaps the most effec-
tive instrument for this purpose is the power of the court to order an election-
at-large. In the case of congressional districts this weapon is a readily adminis-
terable one. The same is true in the county-unit cases, and in fact the district
court has already compelled an election-at-large for governor in Georgia. rw
Where the issue concerns state legislative districts, the use of the election-at-
large raises more troublesome problems. But as a temporary measure it is en-
tirely feasible, particularly if only one house is involved. The prospect of an
election-at-large, in any of these situations, is bound to exert enormous pressure
to effectuate a valid apportionment. The forces at work in local machine politics,
the expense to local candidates of state-wide elections, the possibility of defeat
for the political interests opposing reapportionment (by definition likely to be
a minority), and other factors all tend in this direction. The technique of order-
ing an election-at-large is readily enforceable by decrees directed against state
election officials in charge.
The major alternative open to the court, either as a means of forcing action
by other institutions of government or as directly resolving the problem, is for
the court itself to frame the changes necessary in the apportionment system.
In earlier discussion of the problem the notion that a court would affirmatively
undertake the task of reapportionment was virtually inconceivable. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter reflected this climate of opinion when he observed, "Surely a
Federal District Court could not itself remap the State. . . ."51 But thinking
on the subject has moved with unexpected rapidity. Mr. Justice Clark's con-
currence, otherwise not of a radical bent, suggested such a solution. And it has
already been utilized by courts in Alabama and Mississippi.1,2 To the degree
50. Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1962, p. 21, col. 4.
A lower court in Kansas has likewise ordered state-wide elections. See Goldberg, mipra
note 47, at 98 n.42.
51. 369 U.S. at 328.
52. Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962) ; Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59,965,
Chancery Court, First Judicial District, Hinds County, Miss., decided June 7, 1962. Cf.
Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civ. No. 3540, V.D. Wis., July 3 & Aug. 14, 1962. In the latter
case the court appointed a master to draw the reapportionment plan. After hearings, the
master recommended dismissal without prejudice to further action after the 1962 elections,
a recommendation accepted by the court. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1962, p. 1, col. 2; July
26, 1962, p. 24, col. 8; Aug. 6, 1962, p. 22, col. 3. See Goldberg, supra note 47, at 95.
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that the standard of equal protection approaches one of equal population the
feasibility of this form of remedy increases.
Beyond these methods there are other possibilities available. One is for the
court to enjoin election officials in particular counties from conducting an elec-
tion in which more than a specific number of representatives are to be elected.
Another is for the court to act only with respect to one house, retaining juris-
diction as to the other. More radical is the proposal that the court permit
elections as before but order a system of weighted voting in the legislature, a
favorite device of some political scientists. Other improvisations are possible to
fit the particular case. The courts will certainly retain flexibility in devising an
appropriate remedy. 3
All in all, then, the problem of remedies does not seem as difficult of solution
as originally appeared. Indeed, the normally rigid judicial process seems about
to yield to innovation and ingenuity. Such a development would be in line with
the recent expansion of judicial techniques in some other areas, such as the
administration of anti-trust decrees and of pupil assignment laws.
D. The General Prospects for Judicial Solution
When the decision in Baker v. Carr came down, perceptive analysts were
careful to point out that the case decided only that the federal courts had juris-
diction in apportionment matters and that the extent to which the courts would
acually do something about the apportionment problem was a question for the
uncertain future.54 This warning must still be heeded. Yet an appraisal of the
situation in light of the above analysis, and particularly in light of develop-
ments since the original decision, indicates that the prospects for substantial
reform are bright. The decision certainly opens up all forms of malapportion-
ment to judicial scrutiny. Much will depend upon whether the standards of
equal protection adopted move in the direction of assuring one house fully, and
the other substantially, apportioned on an equal population basis. For the rea-
sons already given, this should be the trend of decision. The problem of devis-
ing effective remedies can be solved. Popular response has been most favorable.
And, in the cases already brought in more than thirty states, judicial response
has on the whole been aggressive. But the ultimate outcome, of course, remains
uncertain.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
It will have become clear by now that the main significance of the decision
in Baker v. Carr lies not in what was actually decided, or in what was expressly
53. It has been assumed, probably with justification, that state election laws may be
modified by judicial decree in order to conform to constitutional requirements.
54. See, e.g., Lewis, "Decision on Reapportionment Points Up Urban-Rural Struggle,"
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § IV, p. 3; Bickel, "The Great Apportionment Case," New
Republic, April 9, 1962, p. 13.
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said, or even in the promise held forth of assisting in the solution of the mal-
apportionment problem. Rather it lies in the far-reaching implications of the
Supreme Court's action with respect to the function of law and legal institu-
tions in modem American life. Essentially the decision marks a momentous
step forward in utilizing law and legal principle for the maintenance and in-
vigoration of the democratic structure of our society and in the assumption of
a positive role by the Supreme Court in that task. In this respect the decision
was indeed a "massive repudiation" of the school of thought of which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has been the intellectual and spiritual leader.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court has abandoned the time-honored
forms of the judicial process. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
is written entirely in terms of technical legal doctrine. To the man from Mars
it would surely appear startling that a decision abruptly reversing the whole
position of the Court on a vital and fundamental issue of substance should be
couched exclusively as a discourse on abstract legalisms of jurisdiction, stand-
ing, justiciability and "political questions." Nowhere does Mr. Justice Brennan
find it necessary to mention the actual facts or issues at the heart of the prob-
lem. Moreover, in the best tradition of the judicial process Mr. Justice Bren-
nan carefully demonstrates that no change has occurred at all, that the outcome
is wholly in fine with, not to say compelled by, past precedents of the Court.
And, again, the Court respects the judicial tradition by deciding only the nar-
rowest possible issue, leaving development of the new area opened up by the
decision to future elaboration on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, the meaning of the Court's action is plain. As the nation has
been transformed from a relatively individualistic to a highly organized society,
and as industrialization, urbanization and bureaucratization have come to be
the chief characteristics of the modem way of life, the part played by law and
legal institutions in protecting the rights of the individual and maintaining the
basic procedures of the democratic process has sharply altered. No longer are
such rights and procedures the automatic by-product of economic and political
laissez-faire. Their main support must rather rest upon a conscious growth
of legal principles and institutions, designed to give strength and vitality to
the ideals and mechanisms of democratic living.
The problem of malapportionment is one which peculiarly fits such a judicial
role. For the usual methods by which a majority can constitutionally gain its
ends are blocked. The issue thus goes deeper than the ordinary questions facing
a democratically organized community. It raises a problem which is, in effect,
anterior to the operation of the democratic process, namely the form and con-
tent of the basic political units which make up the system. The functioning of
a democratic state assumes agreement upon this fundamental issue. When dis-
agreement develops, apart from resolution by the judiciary, the only recourse
is voluntary relinquishment of political power or recourse to e.xtra-constitu-
tional means. If the disagreement is irreconcilable the result is a break up of
the structure in revolution, as happened in the Civil War or on a lesser scale
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in Dorr's Rebellion. Within the democratic structure it is primarily the courts
which are in a sufficiently independent position to effect a rational, peaceful
and constitutional solution. In terms of democratic theory, therefore, there are
weighty reasons for the courts, despite the manifest difficulties, to utilize their
prestige, powers and procedures in attempting to resolve questions of mal-
apportionment.
Thus the decision in Baker v. Carr is wholly in line with the direction that
the Supreme Court must take and, with some lapses to be sure, has been taking
for the past quarter of a century. In the impetus given this crucial development
lies the real significance of the decision.
